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CHAPTER SIX
EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The historical norm in the relationship between church and state is
some kind of union or accommodation.

The concept of a strict separation

may be no older than the country that first gave it substance.
origin is religious rather than secular.

But its

The religious dissident, Roger

Williams, coined the phrase "wall of separation" long before Thomas
Jefferson penned his famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association or
Justice Hugo Black equated it with the First Amendment guarantees.

In a

letter to John Cotton written in 1644, several years after Williams had
been banished from Massachusetts, he criticized the establishment
concept, citing as proof against it
. the faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ, extant
to the world, abundantly proving that the church of the Jews under
the Old Testament in the type, and the church of the Christians
under the New Testament in the antitype, were both separate from
the World; and that vJhen they have opened a gap in the hedge or
wall of separation between the garden of the church and the
wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself,
removed the candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at
this day. And that therefore if He will ever please to restore His
garden and paradise again, it must of necessity be walled in
peculiarly unto Himself from the world; and that all that shall be
saved out of the world are to be transplanted out 9f the wilderness
of the world, and added unto his church or garden.
The image of a wall of separation (Ezek. 42:20) is comparable to
the motif of a hedge protecting the church from the wilderness (Ps.
80:12; Isa. 5:1-9; Ezek. 22:30), which was common to Puritan thought.

The difference is that Williams believed a strict separation was

195
necessary to preserve the purity of the church, while Cotton--probably
with the example of Nehemiah in mind--believed that the erection and
maintenance of the wall was the work of the Christian magistrate.

For

the leaders of Bay Colony, church and state were properly enclosed
within the wall rather than separated by it.

2

This disagreement involved--and continues to involve--a basic
difference of theology.

A century later, Isaac Backus, a Baptist leader

who fought the church establishment of Massachusetts during the War for
Independence, endorsed Williams as a herald of religious liberty and
portrayed him as a victim of religious persecution.

Although this view

prevails in the standard histories, it appears to be based on a doubtful
correlation of this incident and the "Antinomian controversy."

Indeed,

Williams himself denied that religious persecution was a factor in his
banishment.

3

It is Thomas Jefferson's use of the phrase "wall of separation,"
however, that has received the most attention.

In his letter to the

Baptists in 1802, President Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between Man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his
faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government
reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that
their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus
4
building a wall of separation between Church and State.
EdwardS. Corwin's comment on the phrase and its use by Justice
Black in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), sheds some
light on the political considerations--Jefferson's as well as the
Court's--that have affected its interpretation.
The eager crusaders on the Court make too much of Jefferson's
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Danbury letter, which was not improbably motivated by an impish
desire to heave a brick at the Congregationalist-Federalist
hierarchy of Connecticut, whose leading members had denounced him
two years before as an "infidel" and "atheist." A more deliberate,
more carefully considered evaluation by Jefferson of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment is that which occurs in his Second
Inaugural: "In matters of religion, I have considered that its free
exercise is placed by the constitution independent of the powers of
the general government." In short, the principal importance of the
amendment lay in the separation which it effected between the
respective jurisdictions of state and nation regarding religion,
rather than in it5 bearing on the question of the separation of
church and state.
It is ironic that this letter is taken as an expression of the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

At

the time of the Constitutional Convention and the first session of
Congress, Jefferson was serving as minister to France.

He returned only

after the Bill of Rights had been sent to the states for ratification
late in 1789.

Instead, it was James Madison who drafted the amendments

and successfully steered them through Congress, even though he did so
with some reluctance because he believed "the rights in question are
reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted.

6

While

Madison conceded that a "properly executed" bill of rights might guard
against ambitious rulers, he warned that
. . . there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of
some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the
requisite latitude. I am sure that the rights of conscience in
particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowe9
much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power.
Madison's reservations about specifying these rights found
practical expression in the provisions against a narrow construction of
these rights in the Ninth Amendment and against a broad construction of
the granted powers in the Tenth Amendment.

In any event, the religion

clauses that were added to Article VI and the First Amendment, like
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Jefferson's later comments, do not indicate a climate of opinion hostile
to cooperation between church and state so much as they reflect the
lengthy, often bitter struggle for disestablishment that had only
recently been waged in Virginia and was continuing in other states.
They were understood as precautions against a national establishment of
religion--however "tolerant" it might be--rather than as a disavowal of
the fundamentally biblical, and largely Christian, principles on which
the constitutional system was based.

Yet the Supreme Court has resisted

this understanding in recent years, as Mark DeWolfe Howe observed:
A frank acknowledgment that, in making the wall of separation a
constitutional barrier, the faith of Roger Williams played a more
important part that the doubts of Jefferson probably seemed to the
present Court to carry unhappy implications. Such an
acknowledgment might suggest that the First Amendment was designed
not merely to codify a political principle but to implant a
somewhat special principle of theology in the Constitution--a
principle, by no means uncontested, which asserts that a church
dependent on governmental favor cannot be true to its better
self . . . . It is hard for the present generation of emancipated
Americans to conceive the possibility that the framers of the
Constitution were willing to incorporate some theological
presuppositions in the framework of federal government. I find it
impossible to deny that such presuppositions did find their way
into the Constitution. To make that admission does not seem to me
to necessitate the concession which others seem to think it
entails--the concession that the government created by that
8
Constitution can properly become embroiled in religious turmoil.
Indeed, this "somewhat special principle of theology" may have
involved not only Roger Williams' wall of separation against political
corruption of the church but also John Cotton's hedge of protection
against religious corruption of the Christian polity.

Although the

restriction of suffrage to church members had disappeared by then,
similar precautions--such as the use of religious tests--were still
common.

It was only with the assurance--however unrealistic--that

religious liberty was compatible with this principle that such
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restrictions were abandoned.
Disestablishment
Religious liberty was seen by some of the founders as a means of
strengthening Christianity through sectarian competition while still
promoting an essentially biblical standard of law and justice.

Even the

most latitudinarian of the founders were unwilling to disavow ethical
standards that the Bible makes binding on all times and all nations.

A

century or more was to pass before religious liberalism began to
successfully challenge traditional Christianity in regard to law and
morality.
Virginia
Prior to 1776, attempts to obtain toleration for religious
dissenters in Virginia had largely failed.
preachers were beaten and jailed.

A number of Baptist

James Madison was prominent among

those who protested against these persecutions in the name of "liberty
of conscience.''

Following the Declaration of Independence, a state

convention was held to organize a new government and draft a
constitution.

Petitions from dissenting churches called for freedom of

worship, exemption from religious assessments, and disestablishment of
the Church of England.

George Mason submitted a bill of rights that

included a provision for religious toleration written by Patrick Henry.
Madison objected to the word "toleration" because of its implication
that liberty is a matter of grace, not right.

He proposed that the

wording be changed to guarantee "the full and free exercise of religion,
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according to the dictates of conscience,'' although he added a
restraining clause: "unless under color of religion the preservation of
equal liberty and the existence of the State are manifestly
endangered." 9
It took time to work out politically the practical implications of
religious liberty.

Among the first concessions were the admission of

dissenting chaplains to the army and the suspension of church rates.
While general assessments were ended in 1779, the establishment
remained.

The following year, the validity of marriages performed by

dissenting ministers was recognized and responsibility for overseeing
the poor passed from the church vestries to a state office.

10

Meanwhile, churches of all denominations were being devastated by
the war.

Numerous church building were destroyed and congregations were

deprived of their clergy.

11

In response to this situation, the

legislature, which was still predominantly Episcopalian in its
sympathies, passed an act to incorporate the Protestant Episcopal
Church, then quickly repealed it.

The repeal was soon followed by an

act annulling all laws favoring the Church and dissolving its ties with
the state.

But Patrick Henry sponsored a "Bill Establishing a Provision

for Teachers of the Christian Religion" vrhich won the support of George
Washington, Richard Henry Lee, and John Marshall.

It appeared close to

passage when Madison motioned for a postponement of the final vote until
the next session so that public opinion could be registered.

During the

interim he wrote his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments" in which he observed:
The same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion
of all other religions, may establish with the same ease, any
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particular sect of Christians in exclusion of all other sects, and
the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three
pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force 2im to conform to any other establishment
1
in all cases whatsoever.
"Establishment,'' for Madison, clearly meant direct tax support for
churches.

Madison's campaign succeeded.

The assessment bill was

defeated the following autumn and Jefferson's Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom, first introduced in 1779, was passed in January,
1789.

The last vestige of the old establishment--the glebe lands which

supported the clergy--did not finally pass away until 1840.

13

Massachusetts
Much the same pattern of disestablishment was followed in other
states, although at a slower pace.

In Massachusetts, Isaac Backus

argued for religious liberty as early as 1774 on the same principle of
"no taxation without representation" that his fellow patriots used in
arguing for political liberty, claiming that the legislators
. . . never were empowered to lay any taxes but what were of a
civil and worldly nature; and to impose religious taxes is as much
oct of their jurisdiction, as it can be for Britain to tax
America . .
That which has made the greatest noise, is a tax of three pence a
pound upon tea; but your law of last June laid a tax of the same
sum every year upon the Baptists in each parish, as they would
expect to defend themselves against a greater one. And only
because the Baptists in Middleboro have refused to pay that little
tax, we hear that the first parish in said town have this fall
voted -:=o lay a greater tax upon us. All America are alarmed at the
tea tax; though, if they please, they can avoid it by not buying
the tea; but we have no such liberty. We must either p2y the
little tax, or else your people appear even in this time of
extremity, determined to lay the great one upon us. But these
lines are to let you know, that we are determined not to pay either
of them; not only upon your principle of not being taxed where we
are not represented, but also because we dare not render ttat
homage to any earthly power, which I and my brethren are fully
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convinced belongs only to God. We cannot give in the certificates
you require, without implicitly allowing to men that authority
which we believe in our consciences belongs only to God. Here,
therefore, we claim charter rights, liberty of conscience. And if
any still deny it to us, they must answer to Him who has said,
14
'With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.'
Backus's plea to the Massachusetts legislature in December, 1774
was unavailing, as was his earlier appeal to the Continental Congress in
October.

Legal oppression of dissenters had long been forbidden by law

and, although the form of an establishment remained, dissenters could
direct their church rates to the churches of their choice.

Still, this

law gave opportunity for harassment and was greatly resented.

Backus

continued his campaign, first proposing a bill of rights for
Massachusetts in 1783 and later approving the prohibition of religious
tests in the U.S. Constitution.

15

But the establishment held out until

1833.
The Dedham Case
Changes began with the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of
1820 and the Dedham Case of 1818-1821.

An effort to dissolve the

establishment had failed but concessions were made at the Convention.
But it was a court ruling in favor of the political takeover of the
First Church of Dedham that finally laid the axe to the root of the
Congregationalist establishment.

After the pastor of the church left in

1818 to assume the presidency of a college, a faction of Unitarians
obtained the support of a majority of voters in the parish to elect a
recent graduate of Harvard Divinity School.

The school had been

Unitarian since the takeover of Harvard in 1805.
A majority of the church members refused to accept the new pastor
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and, after the parish--which included non-members--installed him anyway,
complained to officials about the takeover.

A committee dominated by

Unitarians was called to investigate and decided in favor of the parish,
claiming that the veto power by the church majority was established in
custom rather than law.

The Trinitarian majority then bolted the church

and took the records, communion service, and trust deeds with them.

The

Unitarian faction retaliated by excommunicating them for "disorderly
walking and schism," then sued them for return of the property.

The

case eventually went to the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Isaac Parker, who wrote the unanimous opinion in
Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 487 (1820), was a leader of the
Federalist-Unitarians.

William McLoughlin believes he was motivated by

a belief that only a broad Erastian policy--allowing majority rule
within the parishes--could preserve the old establishment.

But the

effect of the ruling was to put Trinitarian Congregationalists into the
.
't y. 16
posl't'lon o f a d'lssen t'lng mlnorl
What struck the Trinitarian majority in Dedham even harder was the
court's claim that once they had seceded from the parish they
ceased to exist, at least in the eyes of the law (a view consistent
with the old view that unincorporated religious congregations had
no legal standing). Starting from the assumption that "Churches as
such, have no power but that . . . of divine worship and church
order and discipline" in any parish, the court went on to declare
"The authority of the church" is "invisible" and "as all to civil
purposes, the secession of a whole church from the parish would be
an extinction of the church; and it is competent of the members of
the parish to institute a new church or to engraft one upon the old
stock if any of it should remain; and this new church would succeed
to all the rights of the old, in relation to the parish." Somehow
the Congregational churches had become nothing but the creatures of
the majority of qualified voters in the 9arish. This would have
1
shocked the founders of the Bay Colony.
In the end, disestablishment in Massachusetts came about, as it did
in Virginia half a century earlier, because of the intrusion of public
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policy considerations into church affairs to a degree that even offended
many members of the establishment itself.

The Standing Orders of

Massachusetts were suspended by constitutional amendment in 1833.

E. R.

Norman concluded:
Even this victory would not have been so easily accomplished had
not many of the Congregational meeting-houses passed into the hands
of Unitarian pastors and so offended orthodox Trinitarians that
they would rather have the churches disestablfshed than countenance
the propagation of error out of public funds.
The establishment principle was not yet dead in Massachusetts,
however: only dormant.

Four years later the Unitarian-dominated

legislature, led by Senate president Horace Mann, established a state
Board of Education along the lines of the Prussian state school system.
Mann then resigned from the legislature and became the Board's first
secretary in order to promote, to use his own words, "faith in the
improvability of the race,--in their accelerating improvability."

19

In

his study of the origins of the early American public school movement,
Samuel Blumenfeld comments:
If the American public school movement took on the tone of a
religious crusade after Mann became Secretary of the Board of
Education, it was because Mann himself saw it as a religious
mission. He accepted the position of Secretary not only because of
what it would demand of him, but because it would help fulfill the
spiritual hopes of his friends. They had faith that Mann could
deliver the secular miracle that would vindicate their v~ w of
0
human nature and justify their repudiation of Calvinism.
This new establishment was by far a more subtle one but still noticeably
religious in character.

It came complete with a system of secular

seminaries called normal schools and was later reinforced by compulsory
attendance laws.

The expressly "non-sectarian" religious purpose of the

schools helps account for the opposition from many orthodox pastors and
school masters as well as the controversy among various religious
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traditions--both pro and con--it generated throughout the remainder of
the century.

21

If the practice of intruding politics into religion was

simply a matter of habit, it was certainly proving to be a difficult one
to break.
The Myth of Neutrality
In a manner of speaking, the habit of intruding politics into
religion--or religion into politics--is not only a difficult one to
break but impossible.

A religiously or politically neutral--or purely

objective--standard of law and government is as unimaginable as it is
impracticable.

This is not to say that, by itself, any particular

system of belief legally qualifies as a religion or even plays the role
of one.

For example, the Supreme Court has wrestled for years with the

problem of defining religion so as to include some non-theistic systems
of belief while not wishing at the same time to give credence to every
pretense, prejudice, or preference that calls itself a religion.
Court conceives religion at once too broadly and too narrowly.

The
The

point is that any belief assumes a complete cultural or ideological
ensemble of which it is only one artifact.

It is this ensemble that

represents the kind of ''ultimate concern" that Paul Tillich identified
as religious.

"Every law order is an establishment of religion," as R.

J. Rushdoony repeatedly emphasizes.

22

"The point is this: all law is

enacted morality and presupposes a moral system, a moral law, and all
morality presupposes a religion as its foundation."

23

The maintenance of some kind of standard is unavoidable.

Religion

is not the end of all rational inquiry--the convenient deus ex machina
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designed to squelch further argument by appealing to a higher court--but
the beginning of it.
terms of debate.

One religious viewpoint or another will set the

Greg Bahnsen believes, for example, that the

epistemologically self-conscious Christian--what Bahnsen here refers to
as a "presuppositionalist"--"must challenge the would-be autonomous man
with the fact that only upon the presupposition of God and His
revelation can intelligibility be preserved in his effort to understand
and interpret the world.''

24

Accordingly, the effort to understand and

interpret the world is fundamentally religious.

The practical

consequence is simply this: any system of law or morality will tend to
either reinforce or contradict a given religion.

In America, the

religion in question is predominantly Christian.
Assuming that law is an establishment of religion, it is proper to
ask: what set of religious presuppositions is embodied in the
Constitution or--even more fundamentally--in western culture?

M.

Stanton Evans restates what is often obvious only to outside observers
and adherents of other religions: it is biblical theism that underlies
the constitutional tradition.
Even on a brief recapitulation, it should be evident that we have
derived a host of political and social values from our religious
heritage: Personal freedom and individualism, limited
government-constitutionalism and the order-keeping state, the
balance and division of powers, separation of church and state,
federalism and local autonomy, government by consent and
representative institutions, bills of rights and privileges. Add
to these the development of Western science, the notion of progress
over linear time, egalitarianism and the like, and it is apparent
that the array of ideas and attitudes that we think of as
characteristically secular and liberal are actually by-products of
our religion. It may be said, indeed, that the characteristic
feature of liberalism, broadly defined--classical as well as
modern--has been an attempt to take these by-products, sever them
from their theological origins, and make them independent and
self-validating. On the whole, it has not been a successful
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t . 25
experlmen
Biblical theism desacralizes--or secularizes--the natural order.
Some religions begin with a multitude of fickle deities that man must
propitiate or attempt to control through iconic or symbolic magic.

The

Bible begins with one transcendent God who creates the world and places
man within it as his steward.
is governed by God's law.

Liberty is possible because all creation

Otherwise, there is no security short of

total control and politics becomes a matter of conquest rather than
consensus.
While the assumptions behind American constitutional law are
secular in their expression, many--if not most--of their guiding
principles are derived primarily or secondarily from biblical religion.
The absence of an express statement of religious purpose or even an
acknowledgment of divine blessings has been the subject of controversy
over whether the Constitution is a "secular" or "godless" document.

26

While the religious references it does contain are too oblique to
satisfy critics who lament its "political atheism," 27 other critics are
equally offended by any expression of public religiosity, regarding it
as "religious treason" or as "an establishment of religion."

28

But the

earlier colonial charters and state constitutions were similarly guided
by practical considerations and were likewise sparing in their religious
references.

The customary invocation of divine favor or acknowledgment

of God's blessings, usually found in the preambles of state
constitutions, is generally a later development inspired by the New
England convenants.
But the argument from silence is not a very satisfactory approach
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to the question.

The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution are

. t y. 2 9
a l so Sl'l en t a bou t th e ques t.lon o f soverelgn

The issues which

prompted the calling of the Philadelphia Convention related to the
strengthening of an already existing "perpetual Union" rather than the
creation of an altogether new political system.
founders radically departed from

ea~lier

The assumption that the

principles and precedents is

unnecessary, particularly considering the attention they paid to the
rule of law and the limitation of power.

It is more logical to assume a

continuity of purpose.
With the exception of an incidental mention of religion and a brief
reference to "the Great Governor of the world," the Articles were
similarly silent on the subject of religion.

Yet the retention by the

states of "every power, jurisdiction and right" not "expressly delegated
to the United States" did not prevent Congress from exercising its
customary religious functions.
days and thanksgivings.

Congress issued proclamations of fast

It employed chaplains, directed the importation

of Bibles from Europe in 1777, and endorsed the publication of the first
American edition of the Bible in 1782.

30

If, as Leo Pfeffer maintains,

the political leaders of this period worked from an assumed consensus of
opinion in support of Christianity, there is little reason to suppose
this assumption suddenly changed in 1787.

In fact, Robert Cord has

challenged Pfeffer's separationist hypothesis regarding the religion
clauses of the Constitution, claiming that the facts "prove beyond
reasonable doubt that no 'high and impregnable' wall between Church and
State was in historical fact erected by the First Amendment nor was one
intended by the Framers of that Amendment."

31

Cord notes that the new
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Congress continued to employ chaplains and even provided direct aid to
religion, sometimes in fulfillment of treaty obligations.

The first

four Presidents except Jefferson proclaimed days of public thanksgiving
and prayer.

Sunday continued to be observed as a day of rest.

32

The Religion Clauses
The religion clauses did not make any substantive changes in
earlier practice, except to prohibit religious tests for national
office.

Charles Pinckney of South Carolina first brought up the matter

by proposing that the "legislature of the United States shall pass no
law on the subject of religion." 33

Edmund Randolph's resolutions of

June 19, 1787 provided for an oath of office.
clause was unanimously adopted.

One month later, the oath

When Article VI came up for a final

vote at the end of August, the oath clause was modified by adding the
words "or affirmation" after "oath" and Charles Pinckney moved that a
clause prohibiting religious tests be added.

Given the religious

implications of oath taking, the clause may have been regarded as a
precaution against a national church establishment.

It was adopted

unanimously and placed immediately following the oath clause, even
though Roger Sherman replied that he "thought it unnecessary."

34

The meaning of the Constitution or the intent of its framers has
been the central issue in this century in regard to properly
accommodating the spheres of church and state.

The prevailing view of

the condition of American religion at the time of the founding is that
Christian orthodoxy was losing its hold and that the beliefs of the
founders reflected the heterodoxy of the Enlightenment.

This
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interpretation is equally prevalent among evangelical scholars.

Edwin

Gaustad writes:
Pietist groups . . . vigorously condemned on principle any linkage
between the civil and ecclesiastical realm; religion was personal,
not political, and the redeemed Christian community was called to
live in separation from the world, not in corrupting alliance with
it. Then the founding fathers themselves, largely deist in their
orientation and sympathy, saw the politically powerful church as a
liability for the state and a 5hackle on those struggling to
3
advance the cause of mankind.
American culture undoubtedly had already begun to show signs of the
pluralism that has characterized it ever since.

But too much has been

made of the impact of deism and rationalism in shaping our political
institutions.

John Warwick Montgomery, for instance, acknowledges that

"in spite of the Deistic flavor of terminology in our founding
documents, these documents actually convey a view of government which
.
.
t o some o f th e mos t b aslc
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glves
expresslon
Although English deism--which is often confused with natural
theology--gave birth to radical biblical criticism and influenced the
continental Enlightenment, its concept of an absentee god found few
worshipers in America.

Indeed, neither the anticlericalism of European

rationalists nor the messianic conception of the state took root at this
time.

Open freethinkers like Thomas Paine found little favor.

Others

who held heterodox opinions, like Jefferson and Franklin, were actually
quite ambivalent in their religious views and cautious about expressing
them.

Even then, they continued to draw on the intellectual capital of

their orthodox countrymen. 37
Despite regional and ecclesiastical differences, the American
culture was united by its common roots in the dissenting tradition and a
general preference for local institutions as opposed to concentrations
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of political and religious power.

The secularization of politics did

not mean either hostility or indifference to religion but probably
reflected a laissez faire attitude that church and state were most
secure when left free to find their own equilibrium.

In fact, the

religious views of most members of the Convention were fairly orthodox,
as M. E. Bradford--among others--has noted:
Approximately thirty of the Philadelphia Framers were greatly
involved with the growth and administration of their own particular
denomination. A few were zealous proselytizers. Another twenty
were conventional Christians, in most cases conforming to an
inherited faith. Concerning John Rutledge and George Wythe and
even Madison, there were rumors of Deism; but these were probably
politically motivated calumnies, with all the evidence pointing to
the contrary. Hugh Williamson was a very heterodox Presbyterian
who speculated about "unfallen men" who lived on comets, and James
Wilson was a nominal Anglican who was probably a freethinker in the
privacy of his study. Others were "broad" churchmen who in the
effort to practice tolerance adopted the kind of periphrasis in
speaking of God which the Deists had made fashionable: they avoided
the terms of reverence provided by Holy Scripture and spoke instead
of the "Author of our being" or the "Great Architect." They were
no more genuine skeptics than they were dem~§rats, as was often
made clear in their private correspondence.
The Ratification Debates
At the time of the Convention, religious tests were required in all
the states except Rhode Island.

The provision of the Constitution that

prohibited their use for national office stirred controversy at several
state ratifying conventions.

The debates clearly show that the meaning

of this clause was subject to a diversity of interpretations.
But it was the absence of a bill of rights that grew into the major
point of contention in several states and brought the religious issue
into sharper focus.

Patrick Henry, for example, recited numerous

objections to the Constitution, including the absence of specific
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safeguards to ensure religious liberty.

Edmund Randolph replied that

the "variety of sects . . . is the best security for the freedom of
religion." 39

Madison declared there was "not a shadow of right in the

general government to intermeddle with religion.''

40

Oliver Wolcott of

Connecticut answered critics that the oath itself was "a direct appeal
to that God who is the avenger of perjury.

Such an appeal to him is a

full acknowledgment of his being and providence. 1141
Henry Abbot of North Carolina, however, summarized the objections
that were then being raised.

These ranged from a fear of infringements

on religious liberty--particularly through the treaty-making power--to
the possibility that "pagans, deists, and Mahometans might obtain
offices among us" if religious tests were barred.

42

James Iredell

replied that religious tests were the cause of persecution and an
invitation to hypocrisy.

"Had Congress undertaken to guaranty religious

freedom, or any particular species of it," he claimed, "they would then
have had a pretence to interfere in a subject they have nothing to do
Wl"th • 1143

Thus the debates revealed a general desire to preserve the

influence of Christianity and protect religious liberty, but also
disagreements about the appropriate means to use.
Delegates who sought a bill of rights succeeded in stipulating that
the new government would attend to this matter after Congress met.

In

addition, North Carolina proposed twenty amendments, including one
modeled after the popular Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776.

This

guarantee had already been adopted by North Carolina and other states:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence, and, therefore, all men have
an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of
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relgion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that no
particular religious sect or society ought 4~ be favored or
established by law in preference to others.
The original wording of the final clause of this article, which was
drafted by George Mason and amended by James Madison, read: "and that it
is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forebearance, love, and
charity towards each other."
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The Bill of Rights
When the First Congress met in 1789, James Madison introduced the
Bill of Rights proposal on June 8th, three months after the opening of
the session.

Roger Sherman, the author of the compromise plan that

ultimately prevailed at the Constitutional Convention, urged that the
important business at hand not be interrupted and suggested allowing
sufficient time to test the Constitution before recommending changes.
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M. E. Bradford believes Sherman was concerned lest the enumeration of
individual rights or limitations upon federal authority lead to the loss
of rights about which the Constitution is silent and that a "Federal
authority to define and guarantee human rights would result in a power
of oversight concerning questions related to the internal order of the
states." 47

But the Bill of Rights soon became the main order of

business.
The wording of Madison's original proposal indicates a close
conjunction between the issues of "establishment" and what was
subsequently called the "free exercise of religion:"
Fourthly, That in article I., section 9, between clauses 3 and 4,
be inserted these clauses, to wit: The civil rights of none shall
be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall
any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal
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rights of ~§nscience be in any manner, or on any pretext,
infringed.
The wording was changed in committee to read: "No religion shall be
established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be
infringed."

On August 15, the House went into a Committee of the Whole

to debate this version of the amendment.

Peter Sylvester of New York

"feared it might be thought to have a tendency to abolish religion
altogether."

Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts wanted the wording changed

to read: "no religious doctrine shall be established by law."

Roger

Sherman again declared that he "thought the amendment altogether
unnecessary, inasmuch as Congress had no authority to make religious
establishments."

James Madison said that he interpreted the language to

mean "that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the
legal observance of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their conscience."

But he also reiterated a common

concern expressed during the ratification debates that the "necessary
and proper" clause of Article I, section 8 could be used to "infringe
the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion." 49
The tenor of the debate and the wording of Madison's remarks
warrant careful attention.

Michael Malbin maintains that Madison's

speech supports a hypothesis that the "establishment" clause of the
First Amendment--even in its final version--was not intended to "require
strict neutrality between religion and irreligion." 50

The debate

centered instead on the issue of a national church.
Madison's response to Sherman in this speech is obvious and on the
surface: whether the amendment really was needed or not--he
privately agreed that it was not--some states wanted it. But there
is another interesting aspect of this speech. In two places
Madison misquotes his own proposal, adding a word to it by saying
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that Congress should not establish a religion. The additional word
is significant. If it had been in the original, Sylvester would
never have objected. If the added word had been in Madison's
clause, it could not have been read as a prohibition of indirect,
nondiscriminatory assistance to religion. To say that Congress
should not establish~ r5tigion differs from saying it should not
assist religion as such.
Malbin elsewhere weakens his case, however, by basing it--like Pfeffer's
separationist hypothesis--on the assumption that the Constitution
authorizes Congress either to promote or restrict religion unless
prevented by specific prohibitions.

It is evident from these debates

that the threat of national intervention in religious affairs--whether
of a positive or a negative nature--was the foremost concern of both
those who supported the amendment and those who, like Sherman, opposed
it.

In any case, the amendment neither added to nor subtracted from any

existing power of Congress.
Benjamin Huntington of Rhode Island agreed with Madison's view but
repeated Sylvester's concern that the amendment might be "extremely
hurtful to the cause of religion" by observing that "others might find
it convenient to put another construction on it."

Moreover, in case of

lawsuits growing out of internal church disputes, the federal courts
might be unable to enforce contracts according to the by-laws of the.
religious societies.

Citing the Rhode Island charter as a model of

religious liberty, Huntington "hoped .

. the amendment would be made

in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise
of the rights of religion, but not to patronize those who professed no
religion at all. n 52
Madison replied that he "thought if the word national was
introduced, it would point the amendment directly to the object it was
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intended to prevent.''
of his remarks.

But it appears that Madison misjudged the effects

Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire objected to Madison's

proposed rewording and offered a different proposal: "Congress shall
make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience."
Elbridge Gerry objected to the implication that a national as opposed to
a federal government had been created.

After Madison withdrew his

motion, Livermore's proposal was passed by 31-20. 53

Malbin believes

that the new wording would have prohibited any form of federal aid to
religion while, at the same time, enhancing state power.

This, he

suggests, could have "raised havoc with the powers of the new federal
government.

It was precisely for this reason that Gerry, ever watchful

of the ne1.v government's power, supported Livermore."
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But Malbin gives

no reason to assume that Livermore meant to do anything more than
prevent a nationalist reading of the amendment.
On August 20, Fisher Ames of Massachusetts proposed returning the
amendment to committee and changing the language to read: "Congress
shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise
thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience."

While there is no

record of a floor debate, this is the version that was sent to the
Senate. 5 5
Several substitute versions were offered in the Senate but the
floor debates and even the vote counts were kept off the record.

The

Senate quickly defeated two motions that prohibited any official
preference for one religion over another.

The last clause of the Ames

version was deleted following a vote and, finally, the language was
severely narrowed to read: "Congress shall make no law establishing
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articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise
of religion."

The amendment was then sent back to the House after the

Senate defeated a separate proposal to prevent the states from
infringing on the rights of conscience.

Meanwhile in the House, an

attempt to introduce into the Second Amendment a clause exempting
conscientious objectors from militia duty--another issue with
nationalist implications--had also been defeated.

A conference

committee, which included Madison and Sherman among its members, worked
out the final wording for the First Amendment religion clause: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 56
Implications
The record is fully consistent with a narrow construction of the
role of the general government in religion.
in this area was recognized.

No positive grant of power

A separation of church and state was not

required except where legislation might tend toward an establishment of
religion, as would be the case with direct aid.

Philip Kurland has

observed:
From this legislative history of the religion clauses, a few
propositions can be derived that should be beyond debate. First,
the restraints, whatever they were, were to be restraints only on
the United States. The states had not forfeited, by the
promulgation of the amendment, any of their rights to establish a
state religion or to afford preferences to one religious sect over
others. Second, the national government could not establish a
state religion or afford privileges to any religious group or
impose disabilities on any individual on the basis of religious
preference or affiliation. Or, in sum, religion was to be no
business of the national government.
A third proposition emerges from the legislative history of the
religion clauses, I think, and that is that they were not separate
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and distinct conceptions, but rather a unified one. The existence
of an established church implied intolerance for the nonestablished
religions. The ban on a national church monopoly would.
factionalize the churches and thereby assure religious freedom. 57
Kurland's sweeping statement that "religion was to be no business
of the national government" may be disregarded without diminishing the
importance of his argument that the religion clauses of the First
Amendment are "not separate and distinct conceptions."

While the

so-called wall of separation between church and state has never been
solid, attempts to seal it against all aid to religion has provoked a
new iconoclastic controversy.

The Supreme Court's artificial separation

of the establishment and free exercise clauses frequently pits them
against each other.

The word "religion" consequently has been degraded

into a dualistic, split-level concept in which belief is divorced from
practice.

This allows religion to be treated merely as a system of

belief--its definition being broadened or narrowed whenever
convenient--while its unimpeded practice is severed from the
constitutionally protected area of free exercise values.

What the

Supreme Court includes in the category of religion in such free exercise
cases as Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961 ), or Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), is sometimes effectively narrowed to one
religious tradition in a case like Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) and altogether ignored in various establishment clause cases.
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The result may be much the same as Philip Kurland's third proposition:
to "factionalize the churches."
Since the Court has taken upon itself the task of arbitrating the
various political and religious interpretations of the Constitution, a
large share of the responsibility for the tangled state of current law
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and precedent on religion must be attributed to its decisions and, at
times, indecision.

In some respects, a constitutional revolution has

taken place within the last four or five decades. 59

Yet, with the

exception of the Fourteenth Amendment, nothing has been added to the
Constitution since the Bill of Rights that can account for the
significantly altered place of religion in public life today.
Tax-subsidized schools are being purged of traditional religious
activities which, in turn, are often replaced by new varieties of
religiosity.
One proponent of this development, Conrad Moehlman, has stated the
case for a "common faith" such as John

De~;vey

advocated:

Religion has never left the public-school classroom. It has only
been adjusted to the new synthesis which is replacing the medieval
synthesis--the synthesis of science, democracy, and ethically
evaluated religion. A sectarian public school can exist only in a
sectarian society. American mores were sectarian during much of
the nineteenth century but during the last half-century have been
casting out sectarianism. . . . Children are entitled to a
religion which is simple and understandable, and such an
interpretation has always been in the curriculum of the common
school. What other public institution in history has
0en founded
on the principle of "the brotherhood of man as he is?"

g

But this unambiguously religious sentiment seems tame by comparison with
current examples of values education mandated for the public school
classroom.
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Private church-affiliated schools and home schools are

similarly facing bureaucratic intervention in the form of detailed
curriculum requirements, mandatory certification of teachers, and other
requirements that often tread a fine line between legitimate oversight
and harassment.

Tax exemptions, loans, corporation laws, and

grants-in-aid may serve as effective conduits for regulation.
In order to evaluate these developments, it is appropriate to first
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examine a few of the earlier authorities, interpretations, and
precedents that have helped shape the current state of religion in the
republic.
Interpretations
Many of the early commentators on the voluntary principle in
religion took pains to emphasize that no slight to religion was
intended.

The idea of loosening churches from dependence on the state

treasury was as novel as the penitentiary system that drew interested
European visitors like Alexis de Tocqueville, and it similarly drew
comment.

Francis Grund, who immigrated from Bohemia, wrote that

Americans look upon religion as a promoter of civil and political
liberty; and have, therefore, transferred to it a large portion of
the affection which they cherish from the institutions of their
country. In other countries, where religion has become the
instrument of oppression, it has been the policy of the liberal
party to diminish its influencgl but in America its promotion is
essential to the Constitution.
If the institutional separation of church and state had developed
purely for reasons of state, the character of the American religious
tradition might have followed a very different line of development.

For

instance, the Spanish colonies were governed by a union of church and
state.

Clergymen were licensed and the government was authorized to

elect bishops and other ecclesiastics.

Thus lay investiture persisted.

William Torpey notes that secular control was similarly dominant in the
French colonies "and religious freedom strikingly lacking."
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The

disestablishment of the Roman Catholic Church in France, when it finally
came during the French Revolution, was accompanied by violent
anticlericalism and was followed by the creation of a highly
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syncretistic civil religion.
Although there were strong fears of similar Jacobin violence in
America during this period, the disestablishment of churches proceeded
rather peacefully.

The immediate effect of disestablishment, as Lyman

Beecher and others saw it, was to strengthen the character and prestige
of the churches themselves.
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The nineteenth century opened with a period of religious revival
known as the Second Great Awakening, which centered in the "burned-over
district" of western New York.

Voluntary societies flourished: home

missions, foreign missions, the grammar school movement, the Sunday
school movement, Bible and tract societies, and various charitable
associations.

Religious liberals took the lead on such social reform

issues as abolition, temperance, women's rights, prison discipline, and
public education.

But as Ann Douglas has shown, "an anti-intellectual

sentimentalism'' gained the upper hand in religious and cultural circles,
providing a vehicle through which clergymen and women were able to win
greater social status and preserve some traditional cultural values
while avoiding the responsibility of a comprehensive program.

One

result was a tendency to redefine and subvert old doctrines without
facing up to the consequent loss of center.

Douglas concluded:

The triumph of the "feminizing," sentimental forces that would
generate mass culture redefined and perhaps limited the
possibilities for change in American society. Sentimentalism, with
its tendency to obfuscate the visible dynamics of development,
heralded the cultura~ sprawl that has increasingly characterized
post-Victorian life. 5
These moral crusades spilled over into all areas of life and
paralleled the early efforts by physicians to establish medicine as a
state-authorized, self-regulating profession.

Medical societies sought
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the power of licensure and fee scheduling, setting an example for other
vocational associations.

But following the Civil War, it was

increasingly the idea of professionalism that provided the banner
underneath which the social reform movement could spread and consolidate
its gains.

The evangelical influence began to wane.
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While various commentators disagreed--it is a disagreement that
persists--as to the nature and quality of the religion during this
period, they could not discount its impact.

Alexis de Tocqueville

detected vitality and a centrifugal tendency he considered pantheistic,
concluding:
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of
society, but it must be regarded as the first of their political
institutions; for if it does not impart a taste for freedom, it
facilitates the use of it. • .
I do not know whether all
Americans have a sincere faith in their religion--for who can
search the human heart?--but I am certain that they hold it
be
indispensable to the maintenance of republican institutions.
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But Rev. Robert Baird, an American who addressed himself to Europeans,
heartily disagreed with Tocqueville's notion that religion in America
"reigns there much less as a doctrine of revelation than as a commonly
admitted opinion" and that it was composed of "a multitude of ready-made
opinions" dictated by a tyranny of the majority.
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M. de Tocqueville does not forget that religion gave birth to
Anglo-American society, but he does forget for the moment what sort
of religion it was; that it was not a religion that repels
investigation, or that would have men receive any thing as truth,
where such momentous concerns are involved, upon mere trust in
public opinion. Such has never been the char~§ter of
Protestantism, rightly so called, in any age.
Constitutional Commentators
The religious underpinnings of American political and legal
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institutions have been duly noted by legal scholars, historians, judges,
politicians, and clergymen alike.

Church polities provided models not

only for colonial civil governments but also for the present
constitutional system.

R. Kemp Morton summarized some of these

influences from a Presbyterian standpoint:
Presbyterians had a more republican system; each congregation was
independent of every other congregation in its purely local
affairs, but the presbyteries and synods of pre-Revolutionary times
exhibited a pattern for a union in a central organization without
any loss of fundamental rights. It was from this church structure
that the formula co-ordinating the large and the small states into
one union came. The College of Cardinals of the Catholic Church
formed the pattern for the Electoral College for electing the
President and the Vice-President. The persistent pursuit of
religious freedom by these and other dissenting sects had taught
their vo75ries the philosophy of both religious and civil
liberty.
Other writers have detected Congregationalist, Baptist, Episcopalian,
and Jewish contributions to the constitutional framework. 71
Justice Joseph Story and Chancellor James Kent were among many
sitting judges during the nineteenth century who cited the maxim that
"Christianity is part of the common lavJ."

As early as 1764, however,

Thomas Jefferson attributed the phrase to a misinterpretation made by
Sir Henry Finch in 1613 that had subsequently been perpetuated by
Matthew Hale and William Blackstone.

But Justice Story disputed

Jefferson's contention that it was a "judicial forgery" and quoted the
opinion of Chief Justice Prisot of the Court of Common Pleas which
established the precedent in 1458:
As to those laws, which those of holy church have in ancient
scripture, it behooves us to give them credence, for this is common
law, upon which all manner of laws are founded; and thus, sir, we
are obliged to take notice of their law of holy c~~rch; and it
seems they are obliged to take notice of our law.
James McClellan has noted, moreover, that Justice Story was not
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satisfied simply to base his contention on a single precedent but
attempted to prove that the maxim was a general principle of common law.
The Presbyterian theologian, Charles Hodge, carried the higher law
argument to its ccnclusion: "Whatever Protestant Christianity forbids,
the law of the land (within its sphere, i.e., within the sphere in which
civil authority may appropriately act) forbids." 73

By implication,

then, anything contrary to the law of "ancient scripture" would violate
the common law and the Constitution. 74
Mark DeWolfe Howe suggests that Thomas Jefferson "had always been
uncomfortably aware of the closeness of the affiliation between
Christianity and the common law" and "saw the transmitting of the maxim
from English to American shores as the transplanting of the seeds of
establishment." 75

The idea that the common law established Christianity

remained an important political issue because of the persistence of
church establishments in several states.

In fact, at the time the

Constitution was adopted, five states still maintained formal
denominational establishments while others like Massachusetts adopted
Protestantism or showed preference to Christianity.
Rhode Island guaranteed full religious liberty. 76

Only Virginia and
In all, ten of the

fourteen states effectively established Protestantism; all favored
Christianity in some manner. 77

Justice Story, a Unitarian, abhorred

ecclesiastical establishments but believed Christianity to be the
foundation of social order in America:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of
the amendment to it . . . , the general, if not the universal,
sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive
encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible with
the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious
worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a
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matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would
have created universal disapprobation, if not universal
indignation.
It yet remains a problem to be solved in human affairs, whether any
free government can be permanent where the public worship of God,
and the support of religion, constitute no gart of the policy or
duty of the state in any assignable shape. 7
He agreed with the sentiment that religion should be encouraged by the
state but not through compulsion and not by showing sectarian
preferences:
The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less
to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating
Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and
to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should
give to an ~~erarchy the exclusive patronage of the national
government.
He concluded that, because liberty of conscience is protected and power
over religion is left to the state governments, "the Protestant, the
Calvinist and the Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the
common table of the national councils, without any inquisition into
their faith, or mode of worship."
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Justice Story did not try to make a distinction between the
establishment and free exercise clauses.

His interpretation, moveover,

was echoed by other commentators, such as James Bayard and William
Rawle, both of whom noted the evils growing out of the union of church
and state.

Both also believed religious liberty enabled religion to

flourish in greater purity and vigor.
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Chancellor James Kent of Nevv

York indicated that he found no real difference between the federal and
state constitutions in regard to religious liberty, except in seven
states that still retained religious tests at the time he wrote.

He

regarded religious liberty as an absolute right and believed it went
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hand in hand with civil liberty.
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Nevertheless, during the 1821

convention to revise the state constitution, he joined with Vice
President Daniel Tompkins, Chief Justice Spencer of the New York Supreme
Court, and Rufus King in defending the recognition of Christianity as
part of the common law and helped turn aside a proposed amendment that
"no particular religion shall ever be declared or adjudged to be the law
of the land. n 83
Near the end of the nineteenth century, Thomas M. Cooley, who
publicly opposed Sunday closing laws, strongly reaffirmed the same
judicial precepts held by Justice Story and Chancellor Kent:
By establishment of religion is meant the setting up or recognition
of a state church, or at least the conferring upon one church of
special favors and advantages which are denied to others. It was
never intended by the Constitution that the government should be
prohibited from recognizing religion, or that religious worship
should never be provided for in cases where a proper recognition of
Divine Providence in the working of government might seem to
require it, and where it might be done without drawing any
invidious distinctions between different religious beliefs,
organizations, or sects. The Christian religion was always
recognized in the administration of the common law; and so far as
that law continues to be the law of the land, the fundamental
principles of that religion must continue to b§ recognized in the
4
same cases and to the same extent as formerly.
In a letter he sent to Robert Baird, Henry Wheaton, who then served
as an ambassador to the court of Berlin, described a few of the ways
Christianity continued to be recognized, encouraged, and protected back
home.

His examples included laws governing sabbaths, church property,

blasphemy, oath taking, and marriage, all of which helped illustrate his
point that the church was not viewed as a rival or enemy of the state
but as a "co-worker in the religious and moral instruction of the
people." 85
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State Courts
The extent to which early American law actually incorporated the
common law of England is disputed.

But Blackstone's commentaries on the

common law, which asserted that Christianity is part of the law of the
land, exercised a profound influence on the generation that fought the
War for Independence.

Edmund Burke testified to their popularity when

he remarked: "I hear that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's
Commentaries in America as in England."
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Although Blackstone's

analysis of offenses against God and religion assumed the existence of
an Anglican establishment, he emphasized that revelation is the source
of all valid laws and obligations:
This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God
himself, is of course superior in obligations to any other. It is
binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no
human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of
them as are valid derive all their force, and ~11 their authority,
8
mediately or immediately, from this original.
This belief that American common law incorporated higher law
generally and Christianity specifically persisted well into the present
century.

For example, the first volume of American Ruling Cases (1912)

cited a Ne\-J York decision upholding a Sunday closing law as a governing
precedent.

In Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. (N.Y.) 548 (1861 ), the

New York Supreme Court based its decision, in part, on the incorporation
of English common law:
The common law, as it was in force on the 20th day of April, 1777,
subject to such alterations as have been made, from time to time,
by the legislature, and except such parts of it as are repugnant to
the constitution, is, and ever has been, a part of the law of the
state (33 Barb. 548, 561; 1 A.R.C. 457).
As in similar cases elsewhere, the Court took care to qualify its
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acknowledgment of Christianity as part of the common law so as not to
imply any establishment of religion, which would make Christianity a
civil or political institution.

It declared that even though

Christianity is not the legal religion of the state, "this is not
inconsistent with the idea that it is, and ever has been, the religion
of the people."
As in England, the maxim was most frequently cited in blasphemy
cases.

In Updegraph v. The Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394, 401 (1824),

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted Lord Mansfield:
There never was a single instance, from the Saxon times down to our
own, in which a man was punished for erroneous oplnlons. For
atheism, blasphemy, and reviling the Christian religion, there have
been instances of prosecution at the common law; but bare
nonconformity is no sin by the common law, and all pains and
penalties for nonconformity to the established rites and modes are
repealed by the acts of toleration, and dissenters exempted from
ecclesiastical censures. What bloodshed and confusion have been
occasioned, from the reign of Henry IV., when the first penal
statutes were enacted, down to the revolution, by laws made to
force conscience. There is certainly nothing more unreasonable,
nor inconsistent with the rights of human nature, more contrary to
the spirit and precepts of the Christian religion, more iniquitous
and unjust, more impolitic, than persecution @§ainst natural
religion, revealed religion and sound policy.
The Court indicated that the only interest of temporal courts is to
prevent disturbances of the public peace "likely to proceed from the
removal of religious and moral restraints; this is the ground of
punishment for blasphemous and criminal publications; and without any
view to spiritual correction of the offender" (11 S. & R. 394, 404).

At

405, it added:
Chief Justice Swift, in his System of Laws, 2 vol. 825, has some
very just reasoning on the subject. He observes, "To prohibit the
open, public, and explicit denial of the popular religion of a
country, is a necessary measure to preserve the tranquillity of a
government. Of this, no person in a Christian country can
complain; for, admitting him to be an infidel, he must acknowledge
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that no benefit can be derived from the subversion of a religion
which enforces the purest morality." In the Supreme Court of New
York it was solemnly determined, that Christianity was part of the
law of the land, and that to revile the Holy Scriptures was an
indictable offence. The case assumes, says Chief Justice Kent,
that we are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is
deeply engrafted on Christianity. Nor are we bound by any
expression in the constitution, as some have strangely supposed,
not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attack
upon Mahomet or the Grand Lama. The People v. Ruggles, 8 Johnston,
290.
Although the Supreme Court of Delaware also upheld a blasphemy
conviction in State v. Chandler, 2 Harrington 553 (1837), Chief Justice
J. M. Clayton similarly made it clear that it was due to a lack of
jurisdiction over spiritual offenses, not to a minimizing of their
seriousness, that the common law did not punish the violation of every
precept of Christianity:
When human justice is rightly administered according to our common
law and our constitution, it refuses all jurisdiction over crimes
against God, unless they are by necessary consequence crimes
against civil society, and known and defined as such by the law of
man. It assumes that for sin against our Creator, vengeance is his
and he will repay (2 Harrington 553, 571 ).
The identification of Christianity with the common law was rejected
by the Ohio Supreme Court but its reasons are instructive.

In Bloom v.

Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, 390 (1853), Chief Justice Allen Thurman
affirmed the validity of a Sunday contract despite a statute prohibiting
Sunday labor and remarked that "neither Christianity, nor any other
system of religion, is a part of the law of this State."

Even so, his

reasoning was not inconsistent with that of the Pennsylvania and New
York opinions:
We have no union of church and State, nor has our government ever
been vested with authority to enforce any religious observance,
simply because it is religious. Of course, it is no objection,
but, on the contrary, is a high recommendation, to a legislative
enactment, based upon justice or public policy, that it is found to
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coincide with the precepts of a true religion; but the fact is
nevertheless true, that the power to make the law rests in the
legislative control over things temporal and not over things
spiritual. Thus the statute upon which the defendant relies,
prohibiting common labor on the Sabbath, could not stand for a
moment as a law of this State, if its sole foundation was the
Christian duty of keeping that day holy, and its sole motive to
enforce the observance of that duty. For no power over things
merely spiritual, has s~er been delegated to the government . . .
(2 Ohio St. 387, 391 ).
The Court cited Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Barr 312 (1848), in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated at 323 that, despite the fixing of
Sunday as the day of rest, the statute in question "is still,
essentially, but a civil regulation made for the government of man as a
member of civil society.

"

It also determined that those states

which forbade secular business on Sunday did so through additional
statutory provisions.

Later, in McGatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566

(1855), a case involving a freight loading accident on a Sunday, the
Court held that the shipping of freight fit into the exempt category of
"works of necessity or charity" and sustained a judgment for the injured
dockworker against his employer.
In Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211
(1872), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld--although it did not require--a
prohibition on religious instruction by the Cincinnati Board of
Education.

In a lengthy opinion, Judge John Welch commented that "Legal

Christianity is a solecism, a contradiction of terms" (23 Ohio St. 211,
248).

He continued:
If Christianity is a law of the state, like every other law, it
must have a sanction.--xdequate penalties must be provided to
enforce obedience to all its requirements and precepts. No one
seriously contends for any such doctrine in this country, or, I
might almost say, in this age of the world. The only
foundation--rather, the only excuse--for the proposition, that
Christianity is part of the law of Enis country, is the fact that
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it is a Christian country, and that its constitutions and laws are
made by a Christian people. And is not the very fact that those
laws do not attempt to enforce Christianity, or to place it upon
exceptional or vantage ground, itself a strong evidence that they
are the laws of a Christian people, and that their religion is the
best and purest of religions? It is strong evidence that their
religion is indeed a religion "without partiality," ~Bd therefore a
religion without "hypocrisy" ( 23 Ohio St. 211 , 249).
Such cases as these, which involved blasphemy, Sunday laws, Bible
reading in schools, and other clearly religious issues, are illustrative
of the depth and detail of the judicial acquaintance with Christian
precepts.

At the same time, however, each of these cases raised

difficult constitutional issues that challenged the ingenuity and logic
of the judges.

Many of these and later cases mark the trail by which

constitutional innovations were introduced.

Sunday laws, for example,

were usually defended as public health measures and upheld by the courts
as a legitimate exercise of the police power.

Similarly, in Donahoe v.

Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854), the Supreme Court of Maine cited the maxim
"salus populi suprema lex" in defense of a compulsory Bible reading law
that allowed the exclusion of the Douay version from the classroom.
There is considerable reason to believe such legislation was
tendered in good faith.

But in many of these and similar cases, the

opposite side of the issue was also argued from a clearly Christian
commitment.

Theological differences were often reflected by differences

of constitutional interpretation.

Indeed, the theological term

"constitutional hermeneutics" was used at the time by Francis Lieber and
other commentators.
sciences.

Theology was still regarded as first among the

Moreover, judicial articulations of an explicitly Christian

perspective on constitutional law transcended narrowly religious issues,
challenging the current view that equates secular issues with religious
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neutrality or irreligion.

A case in point is the imaginative blending

of legal and religious scholarship in several opinions by Samuel E.
Perkins, who sat on the bench of the Supreme Court of Indiana from 1846
until 1865, when a Republican slate of judges swept out all the
incumbents, then returned in 1877 and served until his death in 1879.
One of the finest examples of Judge Perkins' judicial writing is
his opinion in Herman v. The State, 8 Ind. 490 (1855), a case involving
a state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor except by the
state for use as a medicine or for sacramental purposes.

The case was

brought before the Court on a habeas corpus obtained by a prisoner who
had been arrested and detained for selling liquor.

In ruling the law

unconstitutional, Judge Perkins noted that "it is not competent for the
government to take the business from the people and monopolize it."
Quoting Thomas Say, the political economist, he attacked the law as "an
invasion upon the faculties of industry possessed by individuals . .

II

He then traced the history of prohibition and its association with
governments that were paternal and absolute in character: "which had no
written constitutions limiting their powers . .

II
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Such governments as those described, could adopt the maxim quoted
by counsel, that the safety of the people is the supreme law, and
act upon it; and being severally the sole judges of what their
safety, in the countries governed, respectively required, could
prescribe what the people should eat and drink, what political,
moral and religious creeds they should believe in, and punish
heresy by burning at the stake, all for the public good. Even in
Great Britain, esteemed to have the most liberal consitution in the
Eastern continent, Magna Charta is not of sufficient potency to
restrain the action of Parliament, as the judiciary do not, as a
settled rule, bring laws to the test of its provisions. Laws are
there overthrown only occasionally by judicial construction. But
here, we have written constitutions which are the supreme law,
which our legislators are sworn to support, within whose
restrictions they must limit their action for the public welfare,
and whose barriers they cannot overleap under any pretext of
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supposed safety of the people; for along with our written
constitutions, we have a judiciary whose duty it is, as the only
means of securing to the people safety from legislative aggression,
to annul all legislative action without the pale of those
instruments. This duty of the judicial department in this country,
was demonstrated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, I
Cranch, 137, and has since been recognized as settled American law.
The maxim above quoted, therefore, as applied to legislative power,
is here without meaning (8 Ind. 490, 494-495).
Later in the opinion, he celebrated the benefits of wine and strong
drink, quoting the Bible in their defense, then concluded:
It thus appears, if the inspired psalmist is entitled to credit,
that man was made to laugh as well as weep, and that these
stimulating beverages were created by the Almighty expressly to
promote his social hilarity and enjoyment. And for this purpose
have the world ever used them, they have ever given, in the
language of another passage of scripture, strong drink to him that
was weary and wine to those of heavy heart. The first miracle
wrought by our Savior, that at Cana of Galilee, the place where he
dwelt in his youth, and where he met his followers, after his
resurrection, was to supply this article to increase the
festivities of a joyous occasion; that he used it himself is
evident from the fact that he was called by his enemies a
winebibber; and he paid it the distinguished honor of being the
eternal memorial of his death and man's redemption (8 Ind. 490,
502).
He concluded his attack by dismissing the public health argument
for prohibition in some of his saltiest language:
It is based on the principle that a man shall not use at all for
enjoyment what his neighbor may abuse, a doctrine that would, if
enforced by law in general practice annihilate society, make
eunuchs of all men, or drive them into the cells of the monks, and
bring the human race to an end, or continue it under the direction
of licensed county agents.
Such, however, is not the principle upon which the Almighty governs
the world. He made man a free agent, and to give him opportunity
to exercise his will, to be virtuous or vicious as he should
choose, he placed evil as well as good before him, he put the apple
into the garden of Eden, and left upon man the responsibility of
his choice, made it a moral question, and left it so. He enacted
as to that, a moral, not a physical prohibition. He could have
easily enacted a physical prohibitory law by declaring the fatal
apple a nuisance and removing it. He did not. His purpose was
otherwise, and he has since declared that the tares and wheat shall
grow together to the end of the world. Man cannot, by prohibitory
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law, be robbed of his free agency (8 Ind. 490,

503~504).

In two other cases, the Indiana Supreme Court struck down
congressional legislation it regarded as lying outside the
constitutional jurisdication of the federal government.

In Griffin v.

Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863), the unanimous Court ruled unconstitutional
an act of Congress that indemnified federal officers who arrested
civilians for selling liquor to soldiers and held that neither the
President nor Congress could suspend a writ of habeas corpus issued by a
state court.

For the purposes of this case, Judge Perkins conceded the

government's right to exercise martial law, but only temporarily and
locally in cases of necessity--"where the civil law is expelled"--and as
limited by the constitution.

Judge James M. Hanna wrote a forceful

concurring opinion that conceded even less ground to the federal law.
In Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276 (1864), a case involving a stamp tax on
state legal documents, Judge Perkins commented that Congress "has not a
right, by direct or indirect means, to annihilate the functions of the
State government" by taxing them.
Two legal tender cases are also worthy of note.

In Reynolds v. The

Bank, 18 Ind. 467 (1862), Judge Perkins dwelt at some length on the
absence of either a constitutional or commercial basis for declaring
bills of credit to be legal tender, but then held that doubts about the
constitutionality of the law must be resolved in its favor until the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled otherwise.

Judge Hanna

dissented, arguing "that by the constitution the right is not vested in
Congress to make a paper named a legal tender in payment of private
debts" (18 Ind. 467, 475).

Two years later, Judge Perkins spoke for a
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unanimous Court in Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 282 (1864), a case
involving a promissory note in which the same legal tender law was at
issue.

Reverting to the Articles of Confederation, he cataloged the

subjects covered by the term "general welfare" and then traced the later
development of the constitutional separation of powers between the
general government and the states.

He cited common commercial practice,

political economists, and even biblical history as evidence of the
unconstitutionality of the law: "Coin was the sacred currency as well as
profane, of the ancient world.

Historically considered, we find that

the Almighty, and His Prophets and Apostles, were for a specie basis;
that gold and silver were the theme of their constant eulogy" (22 Ind.
282, 304).
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As these cases illustrate, it was not uncommon for state courts in
the nineteenth century to give special recognition to religious
considerations and even appeal to commonly accepted religious practices
as a basis for judgment.

This was just as true of secular cases as

formally religious ones.

Indeed, the Bible was regarded as a major

sourcebook of constitutional theory and practice.

The same courts that

strongly asserted the value of religious liberty for all apparently did
not perceive any contradiction when they acknowledged the special place
of Christianity and the Bible in the life of the republic.
The Administration and Congress
Comparatively little attention was paid to religious issues either
by Congress or the Administration early in the nineteenth century.
few exceptions do not indicate any of the profound differences that

The
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began to be especially felt after the Civil War.
The controversy over the maxim that "Christianity is part of the
common law" was closely paralleled by another one concerning the first
Treaty with Tripoli, which had been negotiated by Joel Barlow and signed
by President John Adams in 1797.

One version of the treaty contains a

clause--possibly spurious--stating that the United State government "is
not, in any sense founded upon the Christian religion."

In any case,

this wording was absent from the Treaty with Tunis of the same year and
omitted from the second Treaty with Tripoli of 1805.
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Moreover, a

series of treaties with Algiers guaranteed protection for any "christian
captives'' who boarded warships of the United States.

94

One of the first occasions on which Congress made a declaration
regarding a religious controversy occurred in 1829 when the

Senate~-and

later the House--responded to petitions against Sunday mail delivery by
issuing a report upholding the principle of sabbatarian legislation but
excepting the ban on work "in cases of absolute necessity or great
public utility."

The report noted denominational differences on the

subject, then asserted that the "transportation of the mails on the
first day of the week . . . does not interfere with rights of
conscience." 95

Postal workers were allowed to abstain from work on

their particular day of rest, but this policy remained only an exception
to the general observance of Sunday as the official day of rest.
Then, during the 1853-1854 sessions of Congress, both houses
responded to petitions against the practice of employing chaplains in
the military, at Indian stations, and in Congress itself.

Each house

issued a report finding that no establishment of religion resulted from
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the employment of chaplains.

The employment of chaplains was reaffirmed

as a means of protecting the free exercise of religion--especially for
naval personnel at sea--and preserving "the safety of civil society.n 96
It is noteworthy that the report of the House Judiciary Committee is
colored by a presumption of continuity between the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution:
What is an establishment of religion? It must have a creed,
defining what a man must believe; it must have rites and
ordinances, which believers must observe; it must have ministers of
defined qualifications, to teach the doctrines and administer the
rites; it must have tests for the submissive and penalties for the
non-conformist. There never was an established religion without
all these. Is there now, or has there ever been, any thing of this
in the appointment of chaplains in Congress, or army, or navy? The
practice before the adoption of that Constitution is much the same
as since. . . .
When the Constitution was formed, Congress had power to raise and
support armies, and to provide for and support a navy, and to make
rules and regulations for the government and regulations of land
and naval forces. In the absence of all limitations, general or
special, is it not fair to assume that they were to do these
substantially in the same manner as had been done before? If so,
then they were as truly empowered to appoint chaplains as to
appoint generals or to enlist soldiers. Accordingly, we find
provision for chaplains in the acts of 1791, of 1812, and of 1838.
By the last there is to be one to each brigade in the army; the
number is limited to thirty, and these in the most destitute
places. The §?aplain is also to discharge the duties of
schoolmaster.
But new issues came to the fore during and immediately following
the Civil War.
Transformation
Sectional tensions were already near the breaking point when a
third great wave of religious revivalism began spreading through the
country.

The severity of the Civil War was compounded by the confusion

of religious loyalties associated with it.

Elements on both sides
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treated the conflict as a religious crusade.

The Presbyterian,

Methodist, and Baptist denominations split along sectional lines.
the war, a spirit of

self~righteous

After

vengeance held the upper hand during

the political "reconstruction" that followed.
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The war was also followed by a growing controversy over the place
of Christianity in the republic.

In response to the national crisis,

the National Reform Association was founded in 1864 to restore the Bible
to public schools, uphold Sunday laws, and lobby for a proposed
Christian Amendment to the Constitution. 99
In 1865, after the newly organized National Unitarian Conference
committed the denomination to the "Lordship of Christ," dissidents
bolted and formed the Free Religious Association in 1867.

Francis

Ellingwood Abbot organized a political arm called the National Liberal
League and lobbied for complete separation of church and state.

One of

its fruits was an amendment sponsored in 1875 by Sen. James A. Blaine
that would have prohibited state religious establishments and tax
support for religious schools.

100

Although both major political parties

endorsed a separation of church and state in their 1876 platforms, the
bill failed the Senate.

Like the Christian Amendment, the Blaine

Amendment was introduced on numerous occasions but failed each time.
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Such attempts to rewrite the Constitution or rewrite history were
symptomatic of the much greater political and cultural changes that were
already beginning to rewrite both.

The War Between the States

represents a watershed event in American history.

The political

revolution that accompanied it produced an unprecedented concentration
of power in the central government.

102

One contemporary observer,
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Bernard Janin Sage, who served as one of the counsel to Jefferson Davis,
wrote a lengthy defense of the constitutional theory of state
sovereignty "upon which the anti-slavery sentiment of the country based
itself, in opposing the extension of slavery, the fugitive slave law,
and, indeed, slavery itself; while it supports the action (except
nullifying), of those states which have from time to time defended
themselves against federal excesses."

103

Like Judge Perkins of Indiana,

Sage opposed centralizing tendencies and quoted with approval a warning
by Edmund Burke: "'This change,' said he, 'from an immediate state of
procuration and delegation, to a course of acting as from original
power, is the way in which all the popular magistracies of the world
have been perverted from their purposes.'"
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The industrial revolution of the prewar years was followed by a
postwar commercial revolution that led to great concentrations of
financial and industrial capital through the retooling of existing legal
forms, such as the trust and the corporation, and the creation of
sympathetic regulatory agencies.

The intellectual revolution that grew

out of the romantic and transcendentalist movements of earlier decades
found a new impetus in the application of the latest scientific
developments to the study and reform of society.

Colleges that had been

founded to train ministers and missionaries were converted to supplying
the new professions--medicine, law, engineering, management, education,
and social work--with a new social status, a respectable scientific
rationale, and trained specialists.
was born.

Thus the American university system
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These new challenges required immediate attention and probably left

239

little time for considering specifically religious or ecclesiastical
issues.

At the state level, the customary religious accommodation

remained outwardly intact.

Little changed except for occasional

modifications of Sunday laws to moderate certain inconveniences.

At the

national level, few religious controversies were brought before the High
Court.

But when the Court adopted a more active conception of its

responsibilities and began involving itself in a battery of religious
issues in the 1940s, it had new interpretative tools at its disposal.
It immediately addresed itself to two general categories: free exercise
cases involving unpopular religious minorities, particularly the
Jehovah's Witnesses, and establishment cases involving primary and
secondary schools.

The precedents set during this period appear to have

been the opening wedge in a major redefinition by the federal judiciary
. l l. f e. 1 06
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In summary, the political and cultural history of the first century
of the constitutional era was dominated by a decisively Christian
framework of assumptions and values.

The framers of the Constitution

and judges of the state courts appear to have made a conscious effort to
harmonize a genuine commitment to religious liberty with an equally
strong devotion to basic Christian values and practices.

They left no

suggestion that the temporal laws of men and nations should ever be
permitted to contradict or supersede the revealed will of God in the
Bible.

In fact, they continued to rely on the Bible as an authoritative

textbook of law and political theory to which all sides could--and
frequently did--appeal.
Even so, this same century was marked by profound political and

240
religious changes that eventually exploded the common framework of
values and redrew the political and religious map of the country.

Novel

interpretations of the Constitution and the Bible that brought basic
points of doctrine into question were introduced into public
discussions.

The net effects of such gradually unfolding changes,

however, were so imperceptible and disjointed as to reassure all but the
most vigilant souls of their continuity with tradition.

This was
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educational changes that quietly refashioned the cultural landscape of
America.

While the nature of the transformation has come to be more

widely recognized, it has long since become practically irreversible. 109
\-Jri ting in 1946, Ed-vmrd S. Corwin characterized the transformation
thus:
The Constitution of 1789, even though not originally designed as
such, early became primarily a Constitution of Rights, and hence
structurally a Constitution of checks and balances . . .
The Constitution of the present year of grace, 1946, is by contrast
a Constitution of Powers, one that exhibits a growing concentration
of power in the hands, first, of the National Government; secondly,
in the hands of the President and the administrative agencies. Nor
is the source of this Constitution of Powers at all obscure. It is
the Constitution of World War I pruned of a few excrescences like
Presidentially created agencies, "directives," and "indirect
sanctions," and adapted to peacetime uses in an era whose primary
deman~ is 95 longer the protection of rights but the assurance of
1
securlty.
If Corwin was correct in claiming that a "change of attitude toward
constitutional values" took place during this period which was "nothing
short of revolutionary," an event of such magnitude might be registered
in a variety of ways.
power.

Corwin studied its effects in terms of the war

Others focused on the power to regulate commerce.

While civil

liberties considerations also evoked great concern during this period,
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it was more in terms of direct invasions of personal liberties than with
a view to the erosion of their constitutional presuppositions.

An

overview of the history of Supreme Court cases on religion might very
well yield valuable insights into these larger constitutional changes.
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